This paper deals with privacy-preserving (pseudonymized) access to a service resource. In such a scenario, two opposite needs seem to emerge. On one side, the service provider may want to control in first place the user accessing its resources, i.e., without being forced to delegate the management of access permissions to third parties to meet privacy requirements. On the other side, it should be technically possible to trace back the real identity of an user upon dishonest behavior, and of course this must be necessary accomplished by an external authority distinct from the provider itself. The framework described in this paper aims at coping with these two opposite needs. This is accomplished through i) a distributed third-party-based instrastructure devised to assign and manage pseudonym certificates from ii) a two-party procedure, devised to bind an authorization permission to a pseudonym certificate with no thirt-party involvement. The latter procedure is based on a novel blind signature approach which allows the provider to blindly verify, at registration time, that the user possesses the private key of the still undisclosed pseudonym certificate, thus avoiding transferability of the authorization permission.
Introduction
Traditional Authentication and Authorization services take into little consideration the protection of the user's privacy. For instance, most of the currently deployed AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) functions are managed through a (logically) single AAA server such as Radius [1] or Diameter [2] which univocally refers to the real user identity. However, disclosure of the user identity is, in general, not strictly necessary for the service provision. As widely discussed in literature work [3, 4, 5, 6] , service authorization may in fact be conveniently based on the proof that the user possesses some "rights" (e.g. credentials, certificates, money availability, etc) which guarantee her permission to access the service meanwhile retaining anonymity. Despite the great scientific interest in privacy-preserving approaches, to date only a limited effort has been spent to adapt such approaches to operate with existing and widely deployed standards (see e.g. [7] for a standardbased approach relying on X.509 Attribute Certificates).
Real world application of privacy-preserving techniques has to further face the This paper is electronically published in Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs important fact that fully anonymous access (as provided by techniques such as ring signatures [8, 9, 10] or some usage of zero-knowledge approaches [11] ) is not a viable solution. For accounting or service control/enforcement/revocation purposes, it is convenient to have technical ways to link the authorization credentials to a single -although undisclosed -user, e.g., by having an explicit label (namely, a pseudonym) associated to the user herself. Even more important, social security reasons, regulatory provisions, or even "simple" business convenience, mandate for the technical possibility to trace back the real user identity, e.g when a dishonest behavior is detected or when law/security authorities require so 1 . Clearly, the ability to revoke anonymity must be delegated to third party entities, to guarantee the users that the service provider is not able to violate their privacy in ordinary conditions. Indeed, most of the pseudonym and Identity Escrow systems proposed in the literature [12, 13, 14] base their operation on a single, trusted, third party. Conversely, the involvement of third parties in an authorization system not only is not functionally necessary, but may also be considered as counter-productive. In fact, a provider typically wants to have direct control on the access permissions issued to its own users: delegation of such a business-critical feature to an external party, not directly involved in the service provider business, may be in practice considered a too high price to pay for "just" respecting the user's privacy. However, designing an anonymous authorization system which does not make use of third parties appears a hard task, especially when non-transferability of the access credentials is required. And in fact, to the best of our knowledge, basically all the most known anonymous authorization and credential-based frameworks [15, 16, 17, 18, 7] rely on a complex infrastructure involving trusted third parties.
The system described in this paper is part of a currently under development framework, called SPARTA (Secure Pseudonym Architecture with Real Time Accounting 2 ). The SPARTA framework aims at coping with the opposite needs, in terms of third party involvement, of the pseudonymization and authorization functions.
The infrastructure in charge to assign and revert pseudonyms is reduced to a simple distributed infrastructure whose only goal is to provide valid pseudonym certificates. This allows us to rely on widely accepted and standard-based certificate formats (X.509), and on the efficient and mature means to handle them in a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). The proposed approach is distributed and user-centric, meaning that the user has the freedom to decide which, and how many, entities composing the infrastructure will be involved in her assigned pseudonyms (possibly multiple). While no single entity involved in a pseudonym assignment is capable to trace the user, the system retains the possibility to determine the real identity behind a pseudonym through explicit interoperation (e.g., triggered by an authority) among all the entities involved in its assignment. In other words, rather than being 1 Note that restricting the triggering of a pseudonym reversion operation to the occurrence of one among a clearly specified set of technical events might be overly restrictive in terms of real-world applicability, as law provisions might not be readily expressed into precise technical statements (e.g. through a formal policy language). 2 Our SPARTA framework is being developed in the frame of the EU funded IST Project DISCREET, contract number 027679. As the acrostic implies, we indeed aim at further extending the system hereafter described with privacy-preserving accounting and billing functionalities. The specification of these supplementary functionalities is, to date, preliminary and object of ongoing research work (and as such outside the goals of this present paper).
forced to trust a specific and single third party, the user needs only to trust that two or more entities selected by the user herself will not collude against her privacy rights.
The authorization function consists in binding a specific service provider signature to the pseudonym that later on will be used to access a resource. Different privileges are provided by having distinct signatures for each different resource and access permission level. The service provider signature is performed at registration time through a blind approach (to prevent disclosure of the pseudonym used later on) involving only the service provider and the end user. To avoid transferability of the pseudonym signature (and in particular to avoid pseudonym hijiacking, i.e. having an user submitting for service provider signature another user's pseudonym), an innovative "marked" blind signature approach is introduced, to include verification of possession of the pseudonym certificate private key inside the signature itself, i.e., at registration time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic ideas behind the proposed system. Section 3 details the distributed pseudonym assignment infrastructure and its design as a PKI. Section 4 describes the cryptographic details of the novel "marked" blind signature solution proposed to issue authorization permissions. A preliminary system-level security analysis is reported in section 5. Section 6 describes the status of our current implementation and the relevant implementation choices. Conclusions and current research issues are briefly discussed in section 7.
Scenario and Basic concepts
The reference scenario considered in this paper is the following. We assume that an user is provided with an identity certificate U , for instance released at an initial offline "subscription" time by a service provider SP in the form of a standard X.509v3 certificate 3 . We further assume that there is a subsequent off-line "registration" time where the user presents herself with her real identity U to the service provider SP , and agrees to access a service/resource S. We include the type of access in the definition of S, meaning that if a same physical resource or service may be accessed with different privilege levels, we treat these different cases as different services S. This agreement may be further based on supplementary information eventually presented by the user at registration time, as well as procedures, such as payment of a flat fare, performed (or documented) at registration time. No anonymity or privacy protection is provided, in our framework, for data presented during this phase.
During such registration phase, the user will receive one or more authorization permissions through which her will be able to access S at later times. The authorization permission consists in having the SP signing, with a signature key specific for each service or resource S, a pseudonym certificate blindly submitted to the SP (pseudonym authorization). As such, the authorization permission is accountable, i.e. reuse of a same access permission implies reuse of the same authorized pseudonym. Clearly, the user may prevent linkability by asking the SP to authorize more than one pseudonym during registration phase, and then change pseudonyms, among the authorized ones, through different access sessions.
To be valid, a pseudonym certificate must be released by a third party certification authority (referred to as Identity Repository in section 3), accepted by the SP . The SP may also require the users to access S with a pseudonym certificate satisfying specific policies (e.g., expiration date, state in which it is released, etc). It is up to the user to submit, at registration time, a valid pseudonym, as its validity cannot be checked at registration time (being the pseudonym blindly submitted), but will be at access time and a non valid pseudonym will not be granted access.
An important point characterizing our proposal is that the pseudonym validity, which is delegated to the proper operation of the PKI-like infrastructure described in section 3, is clearly decoupled from the authorization permission, which is independently issued by the SP and binded to the pseudonym. A valid pseudonym simply guarantees that the user identity may be traced back from the pseudonym (through a procedure involving the PKI) if regulatory provisions or security reasons require to do so. But it is important to remark that the SP remains independently capable to revoke the access permission when a previously authorized pseudonym is used in a dishonest way (this being trivial as the subsequent accesses performed with a specific pseudonym are accountable).
Why a new blind signature?
If applied in the above described scenario, traditional blind signatures (e.g., that first proposed in [20] ) would fail to meet the important requirement of providing non-transferability of an authorized pseudonym. The problem, which we refer to as "Pseudonym Hijiacking", is that the user U , during the registration time, may deliver the SP a pseudonym certificate P ′ of another user U ′ , and have it blindly signed for authorization. Note that the other user would only need to give U the pseudonym certificate P ′ for its blind signature, and not the corresponding private key, thus remaining the only one able to actually use the certificate P ′ . More advanced blind signatures, such as the Fair Blind Signatures first proposed in [21] , may be integrated in a comprehensive authorization framework, as the one proposed in [7] which indeed solves these problems, but require to deploy an elaborated operation involving third party entities (such as [7] 's Attribute Authorities/SubAuthorities) to support the SP for authorization tasks. Similarly, group signatures [22] would again guarantee non-transferability, but would require a third party verifier, which is something that we are trying to avoid.
Conversely, we remark that it would be possible to trivially solve the pseudonym non-transferability issue, meanwhile retaining the above described two-party authorization framework, by devising a blind signature which integrates, in its operation performed at registration time, an explicit proof of possession of the pseudonym's private key. This in fact would prevent pseudonym hijiacking as it would be necessary, for an hijiacker, not only to provide the user with the pseudonym certificate P ′ , but also its private key (i.e., giving away the pseudonym). Note that the user U would now be in the perfect condition for abusing of the the pseudonym P ′ : dishonest behavior would be in fact accounted to P ′ , and hence linked to the user U ′ ! As thoroughly described in section 4, we have provided pseudonym nontransferability by designing a novel blind signature handshake which generates a random value R, unforgeable by both the user and the service provider, and which remains unknown to the SP (while it will be ultimately revealed to the user at the end of the handshake, as this value needs to be submitted later on at verification time). R can be hence used as random challenge, to execute what we descriptively refer to as Delayed Pseudonym Certificate Verification. The idea is to ask the user, at registration time, to prove possession of the private key of the pseudonym certificate P through a signature taken over a message f (R, P ), and wrap this signature inside the blind message which will be signed by the SP . Verification of the pseudonym signature will occur later on when the access permission will be exposed (hence the "delayed" verification feature) and in conjunction with the access permission verification.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first blind signature approach which integrates inside the signed message an unknown and unforgeable random value, which may be thought as a "mark" of the act of blind signing. Hence the name "marked blind signature".
Pseudonym Assignment
The procedure to assign a pseudonym certificate P to an user is done offline, i.e. before the actual access to the service, and as such does not add extra time and/or and/or computational burden to the service provision. Since a pseudonym P shall be submitted by the user at registration time (see section 2), the pseudonym assignment procedure is performed after the real identity certificate U is issues and before the registration time.
Consistently with the scenario described in section 2, we assume that the identity certificate U , representing the real identity of the user, is issued by the SP at subscription time. In addition to the certificate U , still at subscription time, the SP further releases 4 a "token" certificate T 0 . This certificate is an alias for the real user identity U , and it is generated 5 so that any other entity besides the SP should not be able to determine U from T 0 . Instead, the SP will keep locally track of the mapping between U and T 0 .
The U → T 0 mapping provides a first level of indirection for the real user identity U . Now, the idea is to proceed with such an indirection and derive an user 4 For security reasons and performance/implementation convenience -see further considerations in section 6 -, the private/public key pairs for T 0 , as well as for all the subsequent certificates, are generated by the end user. The certificate issuing procedure for T 0 is therefore a simplified version of that illustrated later on for the more general IR case. 5 While the rule to compute the token certificate T 0 is in most generality left to the SP , and in principle a random generation of T 0 would be appropriate, for practical application it may be convenient to provide a fixed rule which limits the SP to the possibility of generating a unique T 0 value for each user. This may be for instance accomplished having T 0 = U * where U * is a certificate containing an encrypted version of the user identity. A possible reason for such a practical limitation may be the fact that, in a scenario involving several small SP s, they may not be considered equivalent, in terms of trust level, to the other IR certification authorities deployed in the system. As such, a rule that prevents the possibility for an SP to generate multiple tokens per each user may be appropriate.
pseudonym by simply involving supplementary entities. Each intermediate entities acts as a Certification Authority (CA), devised to i) receive, as input, a valid token certificate, ii) return, as output, another valid certificate, and iii) keep track of the input-output certificate mapping. This indirection mechanism is provided through completely standard PKI primitives and their off-the-shelf crypto mechanisms.
To this purpose, after having received the token certificate T 0 , the user chooses one of such entities, hereafter referred to as Identity Repositories (IR), and submits T 0 . Note that the IR is not able to determine the identity of the user from T 0 , but can only verify that T 0 is a valid certificate, and specifically that it is issued by a valid CA, in this first case the SP itself. In return, the user receives a new token certificate T 1 signed by the chosen IR. This process can be either i) iterated through a chain of IRs, or ii) parallelized, by having the user submitting the initial T 0 more than once and receive in response multiple tokens.
In details, at any generic i-th step, the following same procedure is adopted (we assume that the communication channel is secured and the peers authenticated through a lower layer mechanism -e.g., IPsec or TLS -, to offload the procedure from supplementary security mechanisms not strictly functional for the envisioned operation, and added only to protect from e.g., eavesdropping and MITM attacks):
IR i → User :
In this straightforward handshake, at step (1) the user generates a pair of public/private keys, and sends the IR the certificate (token) currently owned (namely T i−1 to point out that this is the token achieved at step i − 1), plus the public key e i to be included in the next token T i . The IR duly verifies (step 2) that the certificate was issued by a valid certification authority (IR or SP ), and verifies that the user possesses the certificate private key through signature of a random challenge (step 3). Further policy controls on the certificate (state, associated permissions, expiration time, etc -some additional remarks are provided at the end of this section) are then carried out. Finally, if all checks are successful, the IR embeds the provided public key e i into a new token certificate T i . As final pseudonym P , the user simply choses the last token in this chain (where we stress that such chain is freely decided by the user).
Neglecting for the time being security attacks, the identity of a user can be reconstructed if and only if the initial SP and all the subsequent IRs chosen by the user explicitly interact to revert back the input-output certificate mapping. Through this proposed operation we thus avoid that a single entity alone (e.g. one of the IR or the SP ) shall be capable of reverting the user pseudonymous and linking it back to the real user identity. Meanwhile we guarantee the technical possibility to revert the assigned pseudonym through explicit interaction between the IRs and the SP .
Despite its extreme simplicity, this approach is indeed effective and may be extended to give raise to a full-fledged Identity Management PKI driven by the user decisions. In fact, it is up to the user to decide which IRs to use, and whether to use a single IR or a multiplicity (for improved robustness of the reversion of this process). This makes all the framework strongly user centric. In parallel, the set of deployed IRs form a PKI infrastructure. This means that the IR must maintain a list of trusted CAs (both IRs and SP s), and accept certificates issued by other CAs depending on deployed policies (regulatory, etc). For instance, this allows the user to derive tokens (pseudonyms) from a chain of IRs involving different administrative domains or even states, which they may be later on accepted as valid by the SP depending on the specifically issued service (in other words, for some services it is possible to impose that the pseudonym must be issued by a subset of IRs -e.g. from a same state). We point out that the choice of obtaining a pseudonym through a given chain of SP/IRs clearly affects the regulatory conditions under which the pseudonym may be reverted. For a trivial example, the fact that a pseudonym has been obtained by chaining two IRs from two different states means that the authority capable of reverting it must be a trans-national one.
As shown in the next section, the revocation of an authorization permission for a single misbehaving pseudonym is locally managed by the SP itself. In fact we will show that an authorization permission is a credential issued by the SP only, with no involvement of the described pseudonym PKI. A more elaborated problem is the revocation of all the pseudonyms associated to a same real user identity. This can be accomplished in a distributed way by the PKI components through the usual revocation approaches (management of Certificate Revocation Lists). Particularly, each IR server shall periodically check that its issued certificates are not included in the CRL. If an issued certificate is found to be revoked, we can take advantage of the mapping internally hold by the IR, and accelerate the pseudonym revocation procedure by selectively informing the parent IR in the chain.
Authorization Permission Assignment
As discussed in section 2, traditional blind signatures applied to our scenario suffer of the pseudonym hijiacking problem. To avoid this problem, we have devised a novel blind signature which allows to include, at the time of signature, a proof of possession of the private key of the pseudonym P to be used later on.
The proposed protocol is delevoped for RSA blind signatures. It operates by explicitly including an unknown and unforgeable random value R inside the signed message. In the remainder of this section, the following notation is used:
• P : pseudonym certificate, with RSA public key = e p , private key = d p and module n p ;
• S: service authorization certificate, with RSA public key = e, private key = d and modulus n with the assumption n > n p ;
• a: DL-strong base for n (see [23] ), generated by the Service Provider.
• x, s ∈ Z * n : random numbers generated by the user; • y ∈ Z * n : random number generated by the Service Provider; 7
• R xy + s;
• B ∈ Z * n : random blind factor generated by the user, with B −1 being its inverse modulo n;
• H: a one way full domain hash function, such as Im(H) ⊆ Z np Unless otherwise specified, all the following operations are modulo n. Therefore, for the sake of readability we will omit the mod n at the end of each expression. The exceptions are the few operations modulo n p which will be explicitly indicated.
The following handshake relies on the double homomorphic property of the Discrete Logarithm hashing. For any two values X 1 and X 2 it is:
These properties allow us to provide an homomorphic computation of R. In fact, given three values x, y and s so that R = xy + s, we have (a y ) x · a s = a xy+s = a R . The proposed signature handshake is the following.
User :
User → SP : x 1 = B e x x 2 = B e H(A P ) dp mod n p + s
SP : x 1 y = B e xy x 2 + x 1 y = B e H(A P ) dp mod n p + s + xy = = B e H(A P ) dp mod n p + R (4)
A very brief explanation of the rationale behind each step is hereafter reported (a thorough security analysis is delegated to future work).
The transmission of the server side random value y occurs at step (1). Due to the discrete logarithm hashing, it is computationally hard for the user to obtain y. Note that this random value must remain unknown to the user during the handshake as, otherwise, it would be trivial for the user to forge a value R ′ and vanish the desired properties of this signature mechanism. This would be obtained by sending x 1 = B e y −1 x ′ and x 2 = B e H(A P ) dp mod n p + s ′ thus embedding in the credential an arbitrarily chosen value A ′ = a x ′ +s ′ = a R ′ .
Step (2) consists in the homomorphic computation of R on the user side. It is important to remark that unforgeability of R is provided by the usage of modulo n in the Discrete Logarithm, and therefore by the anticollision properties of the DL-hashing discussed in [23] . The term A = a R so computed is prepended to the pseudonym certificate P , and the result is hashed and signed with the pseudonym certificate private key.
Step (3) consists in the blind transmission of both the user random value x as well as the previously signed hash. Note that a second random number s is here added to the result, to prevent that the elimination of the blinding factor, e.g. through (x 2 + x 1 y)/(x 1 y), would reveal a term including only R which could hence be used to trace the subsequent access.
We remark that the computation of step (4), as well as the delivery of two terms blinded with the same B done at step 3, is introduced to have the additive integration of R from the server inside the signature (a multiplicative approach would have lead to a forgeable construction).
At the end of the handshake (step 5), the user removes the blinding factor B, and remains with the signed credential cred = H(A P ) dp mod n p + R d
The user can now compute R as cred e − H(A P ) dp mod n p Finally, at the time of accessing the service, after having duly proven possession of the private key of P through an usual challenge, the user, in addition to P , will present the pair (cred, R), from which the SP will compute (cred e − R) ep and will verify that this matches H(A P ).
Preliminary System Security Analysis

Preliminary Assumptions
In the following we present a list of assumptions about the functionalities offered by the lower level protocols our architecture is build over.
(i) Encryption: All data exchanges within our system are protected by datagram encryption. Employing TLS and IPSec ensures that the encryption algorithm is strong enough to resist to any crypto analysis attack.
(ii) Server/Message Authentication: Relying on standard protocols (such as EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, TLS) guarantees a strong protection against common attacks such as MITM and Rougue Servers, preventing message modification and tagging.
(iii) IP Natting: Employing an Anomymous Proxy (located inside a domain not managed by the user ISP) having IP Natting functionalities prevents users from being linked by any Server which could simply bind different pseudonyms/credentials to the same IP address.
(iv) Safe Key Storage: All the users' and servers' private keys must be safely stored.
Furthermore, employing an anonymous overlay network (such as Tor) could be an efficient countermeasure against attacks based on statistic traffic analysis (e.g time correlation between input/output traffic).
Analysis of Threats
Hereby we consider the following potential threats:
(i) User Profiling (Identity Disclosure): With this kind of attack it is possible to i) revert from a pseudonym/credential to the real user identity, or ii) to link together a set of pseudonyms/credentials owned by the same user. All users are potential vulnerable targets since their private information incurs the risk of being exposed.
(ii) Identity Stealing: An attacker could gain access to a certain service using someone else's identity, consequently the legitimate owner of the stolen identity will be accounted for every service exploited and for any possible misbehavior. Potential victims are the Service Providers whenever a service is exploited without paying for it, or either users if some fraud or illegal action is done using their stolen identities or pseudonyms.
(iii) User Unaccountability (Certificate Forgery): An attacker aims to forge false certificates or credentials in order to obtain service unaccontability as in the identity stealing attack; potential victims of this kind of attack are thus the Service Providers.
Concerning user profiling and identity disclosure, the usage of underlying communication and confidentiality protection mechanisms seems mandatory, for example to prevent an external attacker to reconstruct the input/output IR certificate mapping by eavesdropping the input/output traffic generated by an IR. If we are dealing with either malicious IRs or SP s, in order to avoid Identity disclosure it is sufficient that al least one IR inside a CA chain does not disclose its input/output mapping. Timing considerations may be further critical. Indeed, it would be preferable to use a SP as a final element of a CA chain since it would release the ultimate pseudonym P to be used later on for accessing the offered service; yet, it would be possible for a malicious SP to find a correlation between the instant a pseudonym is released and the time it gets blindly signed.
Identity stealing attacks might happen because of rogue IR servers. We remark that for a successful attack it is necessary to get both the token/pseudonym certificate and its private key (the latter being mandatory to access the service upon verification). However, as described in Section 3 users always generate any public/private key pair so that the private key never leaves the user terminal, hence this kind of attack is difficult to accomplish. Proper storage of the private keys is clearly mandatory and delegated to off-the-shelf software key-rings.
Certificate forgery includes both i) access credential forgery/highjacking, and ii) pseudonym forgery. The former is needed by an attacker to gain service access for himself or to provide access to someone else. With the latter an attacker becomes unaccountable for any misbehaving action. Our system provides protection for both types of forgery, as it is explained in the following.
As regards access credential forgery, by employing our Marked Blind Signature scheme highlighted in Section 4 any user needs to know the private key of a pseudonym P at the very time of its blind signature. We remark that this is ensured by the theoretical assumptions about the unforgeability of either R and A. Moreover it is unfeasible for the user to invert a strong one-way hash function such as SHA-1, which is our default choice 6 . Indeed, forging an access credential c containing the values A, P , R and d p means an attacker has to find A ′ , P ′ , R ′ and d ′ p to satisfy the equation
and unless being able to invert the one-way hash function, a solution this equation can be found only by brute force. Finally, concerning forgery of a pseudonym certificate, we remark that the SPARTA framework employs standard X.509v3 certificate signed with 2048 bit RSA keys. This ensures that it is computational infeasible to forge a certificate without owinng the private key of either an IR or an SP server.
Implementation
A complete implementation of the SPARTA framework is available, 7 showing all the features described in this paper. The whole implementation is based on the RSA algorithm [25] and on the X.509v3 standard for digital certificates.
The SPARTA Library is based on the OpenSSL Crypto library [26] and it shared by all our software components, providing functions for certificates generation and management. Using off-the-shelf crypto functions we reduced the implementation time. Specific functions for Marked Blind Signature have been implemented extending the sub-libraries provided by OpenSSL. In addition we have defined a format for messages exchanging. Specifically, we have decided to employ an Attribute-Value pair format similar to the one used in RADIUS / Diameter. The message is therefore composed by three fields: i) a type field which specifies the type of message; ii) a length field with defines its size, and iii) a value field that contains the delivered information. A variety of message types have been specified (client hello, server hello, delivery of the various certificates previously introduced, key requests, etc) for the setup procedure; the service provisioning implementation may vary according to the kind of service offered, as we will discuss in Section 6.1 when presenting our example web application. All the messages are conveyed over TCP sockets. As discussed on Section 5.1, we assume the presence of an underlying security protocol such as TLS or IPsec to secure all the communications.
We remark that the decision to generate at the user side the various public/private key pairs involved in the described operation is not only due to security reasons (key management is of fundamental importance to guarantee the integrity of a PKI), but it is also strongly motivated by performance issues. Actually, on the client-side we have measured the time needed to generate a 2048 bit key pair, resulting around 1 second on a entry-level laptop (e.g. Intel Centrino 1.6GHz with 512MB RAM). This means that on the server side it could represent a dramatic limiting factor for what concerns scalability.
A Multi Purpose Server M P S integrates the server side logic for the pseudonym assignment handshake (described in Section 3) and the credential issuing handshake (described in Section 4). The M P S is implemented as a multithreaded server thus allowing the management of several clients in parallel without significant performance impairments. The server stores the transactions log in a back-end database. We used MySQL database [27] in the implementation since it is widely used and guaranties good performances while processing logs of many concurrent clients.
On the user side we developed a Pseudonym Manager tool to assists the user through all the setup handshakes. We choose to develop a command-line tool, for ease of integrability in other softwares, with a GUI commander for standalone user friendly operation. As regards the credential verification at the time of service provisioning we also developed a standalone command-line verification tool, with the intent of being easily integrable in the logic of the service application.
Example Service Scenario: Web Portal
An example service scenario has been developed as a web portal. An user is able to login by sumbitting a valid pseudonym (instead of a username), and a valid credential (instead of a password). On the login page the web portal asks to the user to submit his credential file. The Verification Tool is then executed on the server to check against the pseudonym and the credential if the user is authorized for the requested web page. The web portal application is realized in PHP and takes advantage of Unix system call to integrate the Verification Tool. Using X.509v3 standard for digital certificates, an user is able to store her pseudonym and her private key inside her browser using PKCS#12 (Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard) and can protect her private key within the embedded browser key-ring.
Future Implementation Work
As mentioned Section 5.1 the user will make use of a mix network to connect to the web portal, to avoid linkability issues arising by simply looking at the client IP address. We have decided to postpone the decision on the specific network to employ after a full performance evaluation will be available. The web server hosting the portal will accept only TLS connections from clients presenting a valid certificate (i.e. signed by a CA inside the PKI), thus rejecting all the clients presenting pseudonyms signed by an untrusted CA.
Using a web interface to for interaction between the SPARTA components will bring up a series of advantages. First of all, exploiting TLS for connection security and certificate verification will speed up software performance. Moreover web applications are intrinsically user friendly, cross platform, and accessible to a wider scope of users. The Pseudonym Manager will be ported as a plug-in of a public domain web browser (as it has been done with the Higgins[28] Firefox plugin), and the functionalities of the existing M P S will be ported to a web application as well. We aim to enhance many existing web portals that today arise many privacy concerns (e.g. YouTube, MySpace), with SPARTA framework functionalities, providing a novel form of "pseudonymized sign on".
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a framework for user pseudonymization with service authorization. The main novelties this paper introduces are i) a fully distributed PKI-like user centric infrastructure for pseudonym assignment, ii) a system that works with the absence of a trusted third party and finally iii) a novel blind signature approach to provide a valid credential for service authorization to a user pseudonym. Ongoing work on the SPARTA framework consists in the integration of a billing functionality, thus realizing a complete, user-centric and privacy aware framework that is a novel alternative to the actual AAA mechanisms.
